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L222-1 ID SUMMERWIND, LLC a Nevada limited 
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Nevada corporation, 
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Intervenor-Respondent -Cross 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal presents the very narrow question of whether a mechfu"1ic's lien for 
professional services has priority from the date professional services were commenced or the 
date the professional services were commenced to be furnished. Because Idaho Code § 45-506 
provides that the priority date begins to run when "professional services were commenced to be 
furnished" this Court should affirm the district court's order, which holds that something more 
than 1.5 hours of off-site, pre-construction "project administration" is required to establish the 
priority date for a professional services lien. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
The district court denied appellant Stanley Consultant, Inc.' s ("Stanley") motion for 
summary judgment regarding priority on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record 
that Stanley furnished any professional services on-site prior to the date the construction lender, 
Integrated Financial Associates, Inc. ("IF A"), recorded its deed of trust. Because it was 
undisputed that Stanley did not furnish anyon-site work prior to the date IF A recorded its deed 
of trust, the parties stipulated to the entry of an interlocutory judgment so that this Court could 
resolve that single legal issue. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts. 
On June 26, 2007, Stanley employee Steven Arnold recorded 1.5 hours of time for a 
project described as the "Summerwind. Club House" under the task number for "project 
administration." R. Vol. 5, p. 698. Beyond this description, there is no evidence in the record 
regarding what was involved in that 1.5 hours of "project administration." 
On July 13,2007, IFA recorded the deed of trust encumbering the subject property. R. 
Vol. 4, p. 1519. 
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On July 19, 2007, Stanley employee, Rick Sharp, recorded four hours of time on the 
Summerwind Club House project under the task number for "labor." R. Vol. 5, p. 717; see also 
R. Vol 5, p. 699 and 716 (same time entry appears to have been recorded and reversed). It is 
undisputed that this is the first date Stanley performed any work on-site. App. Br. at 8. 
There is no record of Stanley doing any work related to Summerwind project-whether 
off-site or on-site-between June 26, 2007 and July 19,2007. 
II. RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether, under Idaho's mechanics lien law, 1.5 hours of off-site, pre-construction, 
project administration gives rise to a priority date for a professional services claim of lien. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The phrase "commenced to be furnished," as used in Idaho Code Sections 45-506, 
requires something more than just beginning professional services. 
Because the phrase "commenced to be furnished" necessarily means something more 
than "commenced," the district court's order should be affirmed. Idaho Code § 45-506 sets forth 
how priority dates for mechanics liens are established. It provides: 
The liens provided for in this chapter shall be on equal footing with 
those liens within the same class of liens, without reference to the 
date of the filing of the lien claim or claims and are preferred to 
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequent to the time when the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, work done, equipment, materials or 
fixtures were rented or leased, or materials or professional 
services were commenced to be furnished; also to any lien, 
mortgage, or other encumbrance of which the lienholder had no 
notice, and which was unrecorded at the time the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work done, equipment, 
materials or fixtures were rented or leased, or materials or 
professional services were commenced to be furnished. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2 
IDAHO CODE § 45-506 (emphasis added). As demonstrated below, the use of the word "furnish" 
contemplates some type of delivery requirement above and beyond merely engaging in 
professional services. Because this interpretation is consistent with Idaho law, this Court should 
hold that the mere commencement of professional services is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
establish the priority date of a professional services lien. The district court's decision should be 
affirmed because it is consistent with Idaho's mechanic's lien laws to hold that 1.5 hours of off-
site, pre-construction "project administration" is insufficient to establish the priority date of a 
professional services lien. 
1. Idaho Code § 45-501 creates a distinction between preparing, rendering, and 
furnishing professional services. 
Stanley takes the position that the priority date for liens for professional services should 
be treated differently than the priority date for liens for material suppliers because section 45-501 
gives professionals the right to a lien as soon as they begin preparatory work. App. Br. 42 
("Common sense dictates that the priority date for a materialman arises in tandem with the lien 
right, and for professional engineers, such date is when the planning, designing, or any 
authorized services are commenced under Idaho Code Sections 45-501 and 45-506."). Stanley's 
argument, however, rests upon a flawed premise: contrary to Stanley'S position, section 45-501 
does not give professionals a right to lien as soon as they begin preparatory work. Rather, by the 
plain language of the statute, lien rights do not arise unless the professional services are 
"furnished." 
In pertinent part, section 45-501 reads: 
... and every professional engineer or licensed surveyor under 
contract who prepares or furnishes designs, plans, plats ... or 
who renders any other professional service whatsoever for which 
he is legally authorized to perform in connection with any land or 
building development or improvement, or to establish boundaries, 
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has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or 
professional services or materials furnished, .... 
(emphasis added). The use of the words "prepares," "furnishes," and "renders" when discussing 
activities that give rise to lien rights stands in contrast to the use of only the word "furnished" 
when establishing the actual lien. Because there is a difference between these words, 
"furnished" must mean something other than prepare or render. 
2. The word "furnished" and the phrase "commenced to be furnished" 
contemplate the act of delivering, giving over, or providing; not just merely 
preparing or doing. 
The careful use of the words "prepares," "furnishes," and "renders" means that the words 
are to have different meanings and, indeed, pursuant to their ordinary usage, they do have 
different meanings. The word "prepare" is defined as follows: "1: to make or get ready <-
dinner> <- a student for college> 2: to get ready beforehand 3 : to put together: compound <-a 
prescription>." The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Home and Office Edition, 411 (1995). The 
word "prepare" therefore, connotes the idea of getting ready or assembling. The word "renders" 
is defined as follows: 
1: "to extract (as lard) by heating 2: to give to another; also: yield 
3: to give in return 4: to do (a service) for another <-aid> 5: to 
cause to be or become: make 6: to reproduce or represent by 
artistic or verbal means 7: translate <~ into English>. 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Home and Office Edition, 444 (1995) (emphasis added). The 
word "renders" connotes the idea of doing or creating. Conversely, the word "furnish" connotes 
something more than merely getting ready, doing, or creating; it connotes giving or handing 
over: "1: to provide with what is needed: equip 2 : supply, give." The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, Home and Office Edition, 213 (1995). Because the words "prepare" and "render" 
connote getting ready, making, or doing and the word "furnish" connotes providing, giving, or 
supplying, section 45-501 's use of the word "furnished" indicates that something more than 
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merely doing or preparing professional services must be accomplished before lien rights attach: 
i.e., the professional services must be furnished. 1 
When Idaho Code § 45-501 is read with the plain meaning of these words in mind, it is 
clear that lien rights arise only when the objects of the professional services are furnished. 
Because lien rights arise only when the objects of the professional services are furnished, it 
logically follows that the priority set forth in section 45-506 is the date "professional services 
were commenced to be furnished." 
3. The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously interpreted the phrase 
"commenced to be furnished" to mean "first delivered on site." 
The word "furnishes" should have the same meaning in both sections 45-501 and 45-506 
and it should have the same meaning when applied to those providing professional services as it 
does when applied to those providing materials. Statutory construction requires that the same 
word be given consistent meanings and consistent applications, unless a contrary intent is 
obvious. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 630-31, 269 P. 993, 995-96 (1928). In Beall 
Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., the Court of Appeals interpreted the phrase 
"commenced to be furnished," when used in reference to materialmen, to mean the date when 
materials were first delivered on-site. 108 Idaho 487, 492, 700 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(citing Walker v. Lyton Sav. & Loan Ass'n oflY. Cal., 2 Cal. 3d 152, 84 Cal. Rpt. 521, 524,465 
P.2d 497,500 (1970). The Beall Pipe Court expressly noted that "commenced to be furnished" 
did not refer to the first date that a materialman began preparing materials for delivery to the site. 
Id 
1 This interpretation is consistent with Judge Owens' indication on Page 2 of the Memorandum Decision and Order 
Re: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch's Motion to Reconsider that an architect only has lien rights ifhis 
plans are actually incorporated into a bUilding. The actual incorporation of architectural plans into improvements 
upon or to the land would satisfy the requirement that the professional services be "furnished." 
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Stanley, relying in large part on Judge Owens' opinions in the Tamarack cases, argues 
that professionals should be treated differently because professionals do a significant amount of 
preparatory work off-site. Not only is this distinction not recognized by the statute, it is a 
disingenuous distinction at best. Materialmen can and do spend time and energy off-site, 
preparing their product for delivery to the site. This is especially true if a materialman fabricates 
materials off-site for delivery to the site where the material can then be incorporated into the 
improvement. 
Moreover, Stanley's false distinction is not instructive as to how the statute should be 
applied because it does not track the purpose and intent of the statute. The intent of the statute is 
to compensate those who, by their work or materials, have contributed to improving the land. 
"That right of lien is based on the theory that the claimant has, either by his labor or by the 
materials furnished and used, contributed to the construction or improvement of the property 
against which the lien is asserted." Chief Industries, Inc. v. Schwendiman, 99 Idaho 682, 688, 
587 P.2d 823, 828 (1978). Stanley's distinction does not reflect the intent to compensate those 
whose services contribute to the improvement of property; rather, Stanley's distinction seeks to 
compensate professionals regardless of whether their services contribute to the construction or 
improvement of the property. 
Just as materials sitting in a warehouse do not contribute to the improvement of the land, 
an engineer's plans, sitting on his desk, do not contribute to the improvement of the land. 
Accordingly, just as a materialman must furnish his materials by delivering them, an engineer 
must also furnish either his professional services or the objects of his professional services (plats, 
maps, specifications, etc.) to the land so that they can be incorporated into the improvement. To 
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hold otherwise would be to create an unprincipled distinction between classes of lien claimants 
that is not reflected anywhere within the statute. 
Given that the "commenced to be furnished" language of the statute should be given the 
same meaning for those providing materials and those providing professional services, this Court 
should reject Stanley's argument that any work done anywhere by a professional sets the priority 
date of a professional services lien. 
4. Stanley's proposed interpretation of the statute renders the word 
"furnished" a nullity. 
Stanley's interpretation of section 45-506 should be rejected because it eliminates the 
word "furnished" from the statute. It is a well settled tenant of statutory construction that "when 
interpreting a statute, every effort should be made to give meaning to each word so as not to 
render any word superfluous or without meaning." Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 803, 727 
P.2d 1222, 1231 (1986) (citing University of Utah Hospital and Medical Center v. Bethke, 101 
Idaho 245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980)). In its argument that a professional services lien has priority 
from the first date any professional services were performed anywhere, Stanley focuses intently 
on the word "commenced ... " and studiously avoids any analysis of the phrase " ... to be 
furnished." See, e.g. App. Br. 22 ("Put simply, the engineer's lien is preferred and prior to any 
mortgage that attached subsequent to the time the professional services were commenced."). 
Stanley'S proposed interpretation improperly equates the doing of any professional services with 
the furnishing of professional services and effectively writes the word "furnished" out of the 
statute. Because a statute cannot be read so as to render any words superfluous or without 
meaning, Stanley's interpretation must be rejected. 
As demonstrated above, Idaho Code § 45-501 creates a distinction between the acts of 
making ready, preparing, or doing and the act of furnishing. Section 45-501 gives lien rights 
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only when professional services are "furnished" and section 45-506 provides that the priority 
date for a professional lien is the date the "professional services were commenced to be 
furnished." Beall Pipe has interpreted "commenced to be furnished" to require delivery of the 
materials to the land. The interpretation advanced by Stanley must be rejected because it 
requires this Court eliminate the word "furnished" from the statute. Based on the foregoing, this 
Court should hold that the phrase "commenced to be furnished" requires a professional services 
lien claimant to show the fIrst date professional services were furnished or delivered to the land. 
B. Off site, pre-construction "project administration" is not "furnishing" of 
professional services. 
Given the facts of this case, this Court need not decide exactly what it means to 
"commence to furnish" professional services in every situation because, whatever it might 
include for a given project, it must include something more than 1.5 hours of off-site, pre-
construction "project administration." Stanley cites Contractor's Equip. Supp. Co. v. Prizm 
Group & Construction, 2011 WL 6002462, *1 (D. Idaho, Nov. 30, 2011) and lvfemorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch's Motion to Reconsider for 
the proposition that "commenced to be furnished" does not require visible construction on the 
property. Neither of these cases is instructive to the case at bar because neither case details the 
type of work that the respective courts relied on to satisfy the "commenced to be furnished" 
requirement of section 45-506. See Contractor's Equip. at * 1 (noting only that "[lien claimant] 
began providing professional engineering services for the property") (emphasis added) and 
Credit Suisse at 10 ("The Court will adhere to its earlier ruling that the architect's lien has 
priority from the date architectural services were fIrst provided.") (emphasis added). 
While the district court's order suggests visible construction must occur, this Court need 
not draw the line in the same place in order to uphold the district court's decision. Rather, this 
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Court need only recognize that the date "professional services were commenced to be furnished" 
means something more than the date "professional services were commenced." Because the 
record contains no evidence that Stanley "commenced to furnish" professional services, as that 
phrase is used within the statute, this Court can and should affirm the district court's decision. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code § 45-506 establishes that a professional services lien has priority from the 
date professional services are "commenced to be furnished," not the date professional services 
are commenced. Stanley's evidence and argument improperly equate commencing to do 
professional service with commencing to furnish professional services. Because the undisputed 
evidence in this case proves that Stanley did not "commence to furnish" professional services 
prior to the date IF A recorded its deed of trust, the district court's decision that IF A's deed of 
trust is prior to Stanley's lien claims was correct and must be affirmed. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2013. 
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FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
Rebecca A. Rainey - ofth 
Attorneys for Integrated Financial Associates, Inc., 
Geneva Equities, LLC and Idaho Golf Partners, Inc. 
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